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DACA, GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, 
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Stephen Lee* & Sameer M. Ashar** 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 15, 2012, the Obama administration announced a significant 
change in immigration policy:  Homeland Security Secretary Janet 
Napolitano began to instruct immigration officials to defer enforcement 
actions against those noncitizens who would likely be eligible for relief under 
the DREAM Act,1 should Congress choose to pass it.2  This program, which 
came to be known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), has 
become the most significant immigration-benefits program in a generation.  
Not since Congress passed a comprehensive reform bill in 1986, which 
included a pathway to citizenship,3 has an immigration program so quickly 
and positively changed the lives of unauthorized migrants.  Under DACA, 
migrants who met criteria mirroring those included in the DREAM Act could 
pay an application fee and apply for deferred-action status.4  If granted such 
status, these migrants would be taken out of the pool of removable migrants 
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 1. DREAM Act of 2011, S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011).  The DREAM Act proposed 
immigration relief for individuals who have been in the United States continuously for five 
years, were fifteen years old or younger when they entered the United States initially, had 
attained specific educational benchmarks, and who had not committed enumerated offenses. 
Id. § 3(b)(1). 
 2. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Announces Deferred 
Action Process for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement Priorities (June 15, 2012), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/06/15/secretary-napolitano-announces-deferred-action-
process-young-people-who-are-low [https://perma.cc/SG5M-25F6]. 
 3. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359. 
 4. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 2. 
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on a two-year renewable basis.5  Equally important, DACA conferred 
additional benefits, including employment authorization that allowed 
beneficiaries to enter the formal labor market.6 
Prior to 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) circulated 
prosecutorial discretion memos, which laid out removal priorities and 
instructed immigration officials to close cases for migrants who did not fit 
those priorities.7  These memos came to be known colloquially as the 
“Morton memos” after U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
Director John Morton, who authored them.  So, why did DHS move away 
from this prosecutorial-discretion model to DACA to screen out Dreamers8 
from the removal pipeline? 
A common explanation is that DACA was an attempt by President Obama 
to further centralize decision-making authority within the White House and 
those with immediate access, like political appointees.  These officials were 
much more likely to share the president’s values and views on immigration 
enforcement, unlike frontline officers who, as civil servants, worked across 
administrations and enjoyed employment protections.  By this account, such 
a move was necessary to overcome efforts by frontline officers, especially 
within ICE (the agency with primary immigration enforcement 
responsibilities) to thwart or frustrate the president’s agenda.9 
This Article joins the conversation regarding the shift to implement DACA 
and, in doing so, adds an empirical dimension.  Drawing from seventeen 
 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 
to All Field Office Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, All Chief Counsel (June 17, 2011), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3PV7-Y8AN]; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enf’t, to All ICE Emps. (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/ 
releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JGU-8C85]; Memorandum from 
John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All ICE Emps. (June 
30, 2010) [hereinafter June 2010 Morton Memo], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/ 
releases/2010/civil-enforcement-priorities.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6T7-LCTJ]. 
 8. We use the term “Dreamer” as shorthand for the category of immigrants in the United 
States who would have benefited from passage of the DREAM Act.  We use the term advisedly 
and acknowledge serious criticism of it, as well as the advocacy narrative surrounding it.  
Critics have argued that the Dreamer narrative delineates between deserving and undeserving 
immigrants, reinforcing the marginalization of adults who crossed the border into the United 
States and those who have become enmeshed in an expanding criminal legal system. See 
Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American:  The DREAM Act, Immigration Reform and Citizenship, 
14 NEV. L.J. 101, 141–54 (2013); Fanny Lauby, Leaving the ‘Perfect DREAMer’ Behind?  
Narratives and Mobilization in Immigration Reform, 15 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 374, 380–82 
(2016). 
 9. See Ming H. Chen, Administrator-in-Chief:  The President and Executive Action in 
Immigration Law, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 347, 385–86 (2017); see also Jason A. Cade, Enforcing 
Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 693–94 (2015); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. 
Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 187–88 (2015); 
Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis 
for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58, 89–90 (2015); Hiroshi 
Motomura, The President’s Dilemma:  Executive Authority, Enforcement, and the Rule of Law 
in Immigration Law, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 23 (2015). 
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interviews with political appointees within the executive branch during the 
Obama administration, as well as documents obtained under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), this Article makes two points.  First, our findings 
tend to confirm the “centralization” thesis.  Our interview subjects—political 
appointees within the Obama White House and DHS—tended to confirm that 
DACA was intended at least in part to neutralize the influence wielded by 
frontline ICE officers, who tended to embrace an aggressive approach to 
enforcement.10  Rather than trusting “immigration cops” within ICE to sort 
migrants for removal, political appointees opted to empower immigration 
officials within the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS), an agency with experience in redistributing benefits to 
immigrants.11 
Second, this Article draws attention to an element of the DACA story that 
has thus far appeared intermittently or as an afterthought:  the role of lawyers 
in the enforcement and administration of our nation’s immigration laws.  Our 
data shows that political appointees embraced competing notions of 
government lawyering as they attempted to find relief for Dreamers through 
regulatory channels.  In trying to provide Dreamers with relief through the 
Morton memos, the executive relied on a vision of lawyering commonly 
associated with the prosecution of criminal laws.  This vision of 
prosecutorial justice elevates the judgment of lawyers above others involved 
in the removal process, including that of the ICE officers identifying and 
apprehending potentially removable immigrants as well as the political 
appointees empowered to set the enforcement agenda during the Obama 
years.  This contrasts with the vision of lawyering at the heart of DACA.   
The process by which government officials assess and adjudicate 
applications within the DACA setting differs from the Morton memos 
approach in some obvious ways.  Notably, noncitizens self-screen and 
affirmatively apply for benefits under DACA whereas within the Morton 
memos scheme, noncitizens operated from a position of weakness as they 
negotiated relief as a supplicant while caught in the removal pipeline.  Just 
as notable is that lawyering within the DACA model operated at a great 
distance from the actual adjudication of DACA applications—that is, the 
legal work emanated from counsel appointed to serve the president and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security rather than in the halls and conference rooms 
of the various ICE field offices.  This model of administrative justice was on 
display in the rollout of both DACA and the now-defunct expanded DACA 
and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) programs, which 
were accompanied by a meticulous legal analysis provided by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel.12  Thus, our account 
suggests that while lawyers were central to the administration of immigration 
 
 10. See infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Chen, supra note 9, at 384–85. 
 12. See Memorandum from Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Att’y Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, to the Sec’y of Homeland Sec. and Counsel to the President (Nov. 19, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/179206/download [https://perma.cc/CFS6-LQ7X]. 
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laws under the Morton memos approach, they operated at a greater distance 
from the daily implementation process.  The USCIS officers reviewing and 
evaluating DACA applications possessed far less discretion than Office of 
the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) lawyers, and that is because the “legal 
work” they performed looked less like that of prosecutors in the criminal 
system and more like that of asylum or social security benefits officers who 
operated within a narrower set of parameters. 
The period preceding and leading into DACA provides a useful 
opportunity to advance the discussion of the ethical basis for government 
lawyering. In a client-centered profession, government lawyers have 
presented some conceptual challenges given the indeterminacy and 
heterogeneity of the range of interests the federal government is supposed to 
serve.  We save an extended treatment of this question for another day, but 
in the meantime, we offer some tentative thoughts on from where an ethical 
basis might arise in the context of immigration law.  We focus on three 
conceptions in particular.  Two of these conceptions are longstanding fixtures 
of the law and legal scholarship, but to our knowledge, legal scholars have 
not sufficiently extended discussions about these principles to the 
immigration context and certainly not to the DACA chapter in modern 
immigration history.  
One is the conception of normative innocence, sometimes referred to as 
mercy.  This is the principle that executive branch officials can and should 
use their vast discretionary powers to protect those who have violated the law 
as a formal matter but who have not violated basic tenets of morality.  A 
second is the conception of the public interest.  This reflects the notion that 
government lawyers, and governmental actors generally, ought to pursue 
policies that broadly serve the public’s interest rather than the narrower 
imperative of their agency or self-interested elected officials.  A third and 
final conception, social movement mobilization, is relatively undertheorized 
in legal scholarship.  Normative innocence and the public interest are 
constructed through the mobilization and exercise of political power.  Social 
movements amalgamate and amplify the voices of the politically weak.  This 
Article moves us toward a deeper examination of the process by which public 
power may be deployed or constrained through the discretion of government 
lawyers. 
We draw our observations from two primary datasets.  The first is based 
on semi-structured interviews with seventeen government officials who 
previously served in the Obama administration.13  All but one of the 
interviews lasted between an hour and an hour and a half and were conducted 
over the phone during a single session.14  All of the interviewees worked 
either in the White House or in an executive federal agency during the Obama 
 
 13. All of these interviews conformed with an interview protocol approved by the 
University of California, Irvine Institutional Review Board.  Each interview subject provided 
informed consent.  We identify interview subjects only by pseudonym and agency affiliation, 
but not title, to preserve anonymity. 
 14. One interview was split between two separate sessions. 
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administration.  At the time of the interviews, during the Trump 
administration, none of our interviewees were working within the executive 
branch, which is not uncommon when a president from a different political 
party assumes office.  We relied on snowball sampling, which is a useful tool 
for gathering data among populations that are difficult or costly to identify.15  
This was particularly helpful for identifying government officials who helped 
draft, shape, and implement the content of both the pre-DACA and DACA 
immigration-enforcement programs.  Toward the end of the data-gathering 
period, when asked whether we should be contacting other officials involved 
in shaping these programs, interview subjects began offering the same 
names, which helps confirm the completeness of the sampling set.16 
Like any dataset, our interview dataset is limited in terms of the types of 
observations it can support.  In particular, datasets created through snowball 
sampling can reflect the bias of the networks to which we have access.17  
Because we identified many interviewees through referrals, we face the 
problem of oversampling—that is, those with larger personal networks likely 
had an outsized impact on the pool of interviewees.18  To help correct for this 
bias, we also considered a second dataset, one that was exogenously created.  
Journalists obtained internal government documents from an ICE field office 
in Houston through a FOIA request.19  This dataset contains its own 
limitations, namely that it was created in 2011,20 prior to the announcement 
of DACA.  But, at least as to the period immediately following the 
announcement of the Morton memos, this dataset tends to confirm our 
findings and conclusions about that period in the Houston field office.  
Relying on these internal documents also provides certain methodological 
advantages.  In particular, internal exchanges such as email records provide 
a less filtered portrayal of agency dynamics than would in-person interviews, 
which might produce scripted answers. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part I provides a picture of immigration 
lawyers in federal government not featured in scholarship up to this point.  
This includes the frontline immigration prosecutors in ICE, agency officials 
at the upper echelons of ICE, USCIS, and DHS, and policy advisors in the 
White House and at the Office of Legal Counsel. 
Part II retells the story of immigration enforcement during the Obama 
administration roughly between 2010 and 2012.  Here, we show that our data 
largely confirms the centralization thesis advanced by immigration scholars.  
Importantly, our data shows that professional identity and competing 
 
 15. See Seymour Sudman & Graham Kalton, New Developments in the Sampling of 
Special Populations, 12 ANN. REV. SOC. 401, 413 (1986). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Douglas D. Heckathorn, Respondent-Driven Sampling:  A New Approach to the 
Study of Hidden Populations, 44 SOC. PROBS. 174, 175 (1997). 
 19. See, e.g., Susan Carroll, Report:  Feds Downplayed ICE Case Dismissals, HOUS. 
CHRON. (June 27, 2011), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Report-Feds-
downplayed-ICE-case-dismissals-2080532.php [https://perma.cc/Z36R-CFL7]. 
 20. Id. 
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conceptions of government lawyering played a key part in the process by 
which executive authority was centralized.  During the pre-DACA years, 
political appointees relied on notions of government lawyering developed in 
the criminal law enforcement context.  By issuing guidance documents and 
setting enforcement priorities, immigration enforcement during this era 
operated under the assumption that the immigration attorney had a 
comparative advantage in terms of identifying the kinds of cases that should 
be screened out of the removal pipeline.  This is how much of the criminal 
law enforcement system operates and, in fact, this was part of the messaging 
that OPLA attorneys received.  Thus, the creation of DACA amounted to a 
reassignment of discretionary authority, away from OPLA attorneys and 
away from frontline officers in meaningful ways.  Instead, DACA is 
characterized by legal expertise operating at the senior levels of 
administration. 
With a clear picture of the different ways that government lawyers shape 
immigration policy, Part III wrestles with the larger questions of what ethical 
constraints, if any, can limit and therefore legitimate the exercise of legal 
authority in this context.  Borrowing from the legal-profession literature, we 
focus on two types of potential limitations, normative innocence and the 
public interest, and the process by which the politically weak may contribute 
to a delineation of these conceptions. 
I.  IMMIGRATION LAWYERS IN THE GOVERNMENT 
Over the last several years, legal scholars have generated an important and 
helpful body of work focusing on the relationship between administrative 
practice and immigration law.21  One way to understand this work is as an 
attempt to disaggregate and examine the various components that comprise 
the “executive.”22  The result has been a crisper and more precise 
understanding of who exactly is “tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed,”23 at least in the immigration realm.  This Part contributes to this 
project of disaggregation by foregrounding the work of lawyers within the 
executive dedicated to the implementation of federal immigration laws.24 
A core function of the government is to effectuate the immigration code’s 
deportation, or removal, provisions.  These provisions invite great concern 
because of the human consequences of the expulsion of noncitizens.  
Lawyers feature prominently throughout this process.  Removal decisions are 
not adjudicated before Article III courts.  Rather, these decisions are largely 
resolved at the administrative level before immigration judges (IJs), who are 
 
 21. See generally Chen, supra note 9; Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 9; Jill E. Family, 
Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 565 (2012); 
Cristina M. Rodríguez, Constraint Through Delegation:  The Case of Executive Control over 
Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787 (2010). 
 22. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 9, at 359. 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 24. For a helpful examination of the pathologies associated with our immigration judge 
corps, which is comprised of lawyers, see generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring 
Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635 (2010). 
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housed within the DOJ.25  IJs are the primary adjudicators within the 
immigration system and, by department regulation, they are required to be 
lawyers.26  The DOJ also houses the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 
which handles most appellate matters related to IJ decisions.27  Congress has 
given the power to adjudicate immigration matters to the Attorney General 
by statute, but like IJs, the BIA is purely a creation of regulation.28 
The federal immigration system separates the adjudication of removal 
from its prosecution in administering these removal provisions.  The federal 
lawyers charged with the responsibility of initiating removal proceedings 
against noncitizens work within ICE, which is housed in an entirely different 
department than IJs and the BIA.29  Specifically, lawyers working within the 
OPLA—a program within ICE—represent the DHS in removal proceedings 
before IJs.30  OPLA employs 1100 lawyers and 350 support personnel.31  It 
is divided into several “Offices of Chief Counsel,” which are scattered 
throughout the United States.32  As removal orders are appealed to the federal 
courts, lawyers in the Office of Immigration Litigation represent the 
government,33 but OPLA lawyers provide support throughout the process.34 
Of course, in a technical sense, OPLA lawyers oversee a regulatory regime 
grounded in civil law and penalties, and yet the influence they wield over the 
criminal system warrants a broader critique.  As legal scholars have 
persuasively argued, our immigration system provides an uneven and 
asymmetric set of protections and freely allows for the intermingling between 
criminal and civil legal tools to give federal regulators the greatest advantage 
 
 25. Beyond the IJs, federal district courts and magistrate judges play an important role in 
the adjudication of immigration-related crimes.  Federal prosecutors initiate immigration-
related criminal charges for crimes such as illegal reentry and smuggling before Article III 
courts. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (2010).  
Magistrate judges oversee “petty courts” to resolve misdemeanor charges like mere illegal 
entry (as opposed to illegal reentry after removal). Id. at 1288. 
 26. See Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/legal-careers/ 
job/immigration-judge [https://perma.cc/WB4J-L9N4] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 27. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-
of-immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/9P2N-LQZS] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 28. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a), (h) (2018). 
 29. See Who We Are, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/ 
about [https://perma.cc/7RLR-4HSL] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 30. Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA), U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/opla#wcm-survey-target-id [http://perma.cc/B9P3-SYP6] 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 31. See id. 
 32. See Principal Legal Advisor Offices, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
https://www.ice.gov/contact/legal [https://perma.cc/CJ4E-TNYD] (last visited Mar. 15, 
2019). 
 33. This office is lodged within the DOJ. See Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/civil/office-immigration-litigation [https://perma.cc/3WS7-
EFJH] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 34. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2019 BUDGET IN BRIEF 33 (2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20BIB%202019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N56V-VMUQ]. 
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possible over noncitizens.35  In addition to their power to initiate and to 
represent the government in removal proceedings, OPLA lawyers work 
closely with federal criminal prosecutors lodged within the DOJ.  To assist 
criminal prosecutors, OPLA lawyers can exercise their discretion to delay the 
enforcement of immigration laws or effectuation of removal.36 
An interagency program known as the “Special Assistant United States 
Attorney” (SAUSA) program allows government immigration lawyers to do 
a rotation within the DOJ prosecuting immigration-related crimes.37  As 
Ingrid Eagly has documented, the program allows attorneys within the 
Border Patrol and ICE to oversee large-scale enforcement actions, especially 
within the illegal-entry context.38  The SAUSA program is also notable for 
the space it makes for nonlawyers to carry out lawyerly responsibilities.39  As 
Professor Eagly observes, Border Patrol agents (that is, nonlawyers) have 
from time to time carried out misdemeanor prosecutions for illegal entry.40  
Under this arrangement, Border Patrol agents represent the government in 
court and handle all aspects of that prosecution unless the defendant requests 
a trial involving a licensed attorney.41 
Aside from the enforcement of immigration laws, the other major role 
undertaken by agencies is the distribution of immigration-related benefits.  
The most recognizable program in this regard has been the DACA program, 
which conferred upon its beneficiaries the opportunity to obtain work 
authorization or “papers.”42  This program was administered by USCIS, 
which is a separate agency from ICE.43  Strictly speaking, DACA 
applications were not adjudicated by lawyers, but USCIS did employ an 
internal review process that utilized legal expertise. 
In particular, USCIS appointed a person to serve as ombudsman.44  This 
was a position created by statute under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
which reorganized immigration agencies.45  Like many ombudsman 
 
 35. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 613, 631–32, 636–39 (2012); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of 
Immigration Law:  Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 469, 475 (2007). 
 36. See Protecting the Homeland:  Tool Kit for Prosecutors, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT (Apr. 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/osltc/pdf/tool-kit-for-
prosecutors.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZCJ8-BQ5V]; see also David Alan Sklansky, Crime, 
Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 220–21 (2012). 
 37. See Eagly, supra note 25, at 1332. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. at 1333. 
 40. See id. at 1332–33. 
 41. See id. at 1333. 
 42. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
 43. See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/archive/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-
arrivals-daca [https://perma.cc/2RT6-34QW] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 44. Ombudsman—Case Assistance, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 
https://www.dhs.gov/case-assistance [https://perma.cc/S36H-66V7] (last visited Mar. 15, 
2019). 
 45. Specifically, Congress provides:  “Within the Department, there shall be a position of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (in this section referred to as the 
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programs, this office within USCIS is charged with resolving problems 
between and among affected members of the public and decision makers 
within the agency.46  The ombudsman has no formal enforcement authority.47  
She can only make recommendations in particular cases.48 
Most of the ombudsman’s power lies in documentation of agency 
performance as a whole.  She is required to summarize and create an 
inventory of major problems plaguing the agency with an annual report to 
Congress.49  Importantly, Congress intended for the ombudsman to enjoy 
some measure of independence and autonomy.  Congress requires the 
ombudsman to send its annual report without any “prior comment or 
amendment” by senior leadership,50 and each local ombudsman office must 
have forms of communication that are not subject to USCIS control or 
oversight.51  The ombudsman’s power is akin to that wielded by inspectors 
general.52 
Finally, beyond enforcement and benefit programs, DHS utilizes legal 
expertise the way many agencies do, namely through general counsel offices.  
Just as ICE benefits from OPLA lawyers, other agencies with primary 
immigration responsibilities, such as USCIS and Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), also utilize the services of “Chief Counsels.”53  While 
lawyers at the leadership level are political appointee positions—that is, 
lawyers who had to be confirmed by the Senate54—most operated as a part 
of the civil service corps.  The DHS indicates that over 1800 lawyers serve 
as general counsel.55  General counsel facilitate the implementation of 
immigration laws by providing advice on the legality of a variety of programs 
and initiatives.56 
 
‘Ombudsman’).  The Ombudsman shall report directly to the Deputy Secretary.  The 
Ombudsman shall have a background in customer service as well as immigration law.” See 
Homeland Security Act § 452, 6 U.S.C. § 272(a) (2012). 
 46. See Ombudsman—Case Assistance, supra note 44. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See 6 U.S.C. § 272(c)(1) (2012). 
 50. See id. § 272(c)(2). 
 51. See id. § 272(g)(2). 
 52. See Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within?  Inspectors General and National 
Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1034–35 (2013); see also Shirin Sinnar, Internal 
Oversight and the Tenuous Protection of Norms, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 61, 62 (2018). 
 53. See Department of Homeland Security, Office of the General Counsel, Organization 
Chart Level 1, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Aug. 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/publications/OGC%20Level%201%20%205-16.%20Generic.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V9K5-RAQU]. 
 54. CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS & MICHAEL GREENE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30959, 
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE POSITIONS REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION AND COMMITTEES 
HANDLING NOMINATIONS 23, 35, 39, 41 (2017). 
 55. See Office of the General Counsel, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 
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II.  FROM PROSECUTORIAL TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 
Immigration-enforcement policy during the Obama administration has 
been characterized as an exercise of centralization.  Frustrated by a vast 
constellation of field offices, each operating largely independent of one 
another and without regard to the preferences of the White House, President 
Obama and senior leadership within the DHS set about to bring frontline 
immigration officials into alignment.  As we show in this Part, empirical data 
supports this centralization thesis. 
On December 18, 2010, the DREAM Act failed to clear the Senate.57  
From then on, immigrant youth activists increasingly came to focus on the 
formation of enforcement policy within DHS.58  Importantly, as our data 
shows, the means by which the executive centralized authority utilized logic 
that is grounded in competing notions of lawyering and professional identity.  
Between this period and June 15, 2012, when DACA was announced, the 
DHS utilized a prosecutorial-justice model to help more equitably protect a 
category of immigrants who would be harshly impacted by removal.59  Over 
time, this category evolved to become largely congruent with the Dreamer 
population.  White House and senior DHS officials sought to create a new 
culture among its immigration lawyers so that government lawyers 
reimagined themselves as federal criminal prosecutors akin to U.S. attorneys.  
This is significant because, as mentioned earlier, the law treats immigration 
law—and therefore, the work that government officials do in this area—as 
civil, not criminal.60  And yet, political appointees often and freely borrowed 
from notions of prosecutorial discretion developed largely in the criminal 
context to implement their mandate.  Ultimately, the DHS struggled to 
successfully screen out Dreamers through this model, which helped lead to 
the creation of the DACA program.  From a professional-identity standpoint, 
the hallmark of the DACA program was the use of legal expertise at the 
highest level of administration rather than at the moment of frontline 
implementation. 
A.  Priorities and Nonpriorities 
Not long after Janet Napolitano was confirmed as Secretary of Homeland 
Security, she and her deputies began working to streamline the immigrant-
removal process.  Working closely with senior leadership in the three major 
immigration agencies—ICE, USCIS, and CBP—Secretary Napolitano and 
the DHS senior leadership sought out ways to maximize their resources.  The 
primary strategy DHS relied upon was priority-setting—that is, identifying 
 
 57. See Procedural Vote on DREAM Act Fails in Senate, CNN (Dec. 18, 2010), 
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the specific groups that immigration officials should target for removal.61  
ICE Director John Morton was crucial in this regard.  He issued a series of 
memos articulating the types of migrants ICE officials should target, policies 
on prosecutorial discretion, and instituting interagency collaborations to 
ensure that those otherwise-removable immigrants who had nonfrivolous 
claims for relief had the chance to pursue them on an expedited basis.62  He 
issued these “Morton memos” over a span of two years beginning in the 
summer of 2010.63 
One of the ways that ICE separated priorities from nonpriorities was 
through the presence of a pending application for an immigrant visa.  In 
deciding whether to proceed with the removal of apprehended migrants, John 
Morton instructed agency personnel to focus on whether the migrant had a 
pending application with USCIS that might serve as the basis for relief 
against removal.64  This directive both focused ICE’s attention on the 
presence of these factors in the removal process and instructed USCIS to 
engage in an expedited review of such migrants.65 
To the extent the Morton memos offered any kind of relief, such relief was 
defined in the negative—that is, migrants who were not an enforcement 
priority could take some comfort in knowing that they faced a statistically 
low chance of being expelled from the country.  At least this is how senior 
officials described that system. 
One interviewee, David, has had a long career in federal law 
enforcement.66  He served as a part of senior leadership in ICE during the 
first several years of the Obama administration.67  He described the years 
governed by the Morton memos in these terms: 
Let’s say the majority of the 11 or 12 million people who are here in 
undocumented status . . . you know, they have virtually no chance of being 
arrested these days.  ICE is not out there looking for undocumented aliens 
who have not committed crimes, who don’t pose a threat to the community.  
They’re just not.  So, you don’t want to put yourself in the situation in the 
future where you might become a priority.68 
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Another senior official, also within ICE, concurred:  “If they’re not 
committing a crime, we’re not gonna get them out anyway, and that should 
not be our priority.”69 
In formal terms, the legal relief that ICE government lawyers offered at 
this time was usually administrative closure—that is, the government would 
decline to initiate removal proceedings against the noncitizen.70  
Administrative closure did not create a pathway to regularizing status.71  
Neither did it offer migrants employment-authorization documents, which 
would open up access to the formal labor market. 
Another frequent complaint lodged by immigrant advocates, especially 
from the immigration bar, was the nature of the relief offered by prosecutorial 
discretion.72  Even if a migrant caught up in the removal pipeline received a 
favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the migrant would only be able 
to receive administrative closure and not an opportunity to work.73  As one 
official put it, “It wasn’t a good enough deal.  They’d rather take their 
chances on a cancellation claim or their asylum claim than they would with 
some other claim they might have, you know, than they would accept 
administrative closure.”74 
During this period, the only type of administrative action that might be 
characterized as relief was to identify those removable immigrants with 
pending applications for relief with USCIS, which oversaw the family-based 
green card petition process, among other programs.  Georgia, a senior White 
House official, confirmed that the enforcement-benefits distinction that is 
often used to distinguish between ICE and USCIS was slightly overstated: 
I mean USCIS seemed like the most logical agency . . . .  This is not the 
kind of thing that ICE does on a regular basis.  And the idea was, you know 
DACA is a law enforcement policy, it’s not a benefits policy.  The idea is 
that these folks should be out of the enforcement process and . . . allow ICE 
to go after people who are priorities.  So you know, let’s not bog them down 
with implementing a program they have no expertise in.  Let’s give it to the 
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agency within DHS, which is also you know an agency that cares about 
enforcement and does have enforcement as a part of their mandate . . . let’s 
give it to them to implement it because we think they have the infrastructure 
to actually pull it together.75 
While ICE and USCIS are often understood to operate under separate 
mandates and have separate types of workplace cultures, the two agencies 
nevertheless coordinated their regulatory efforts in significant ways. 
Things began to change on December 18, 2010, when the DREAM Act 
failed to clear the Senate.  Up until that point, the groups categorized as 
nonpriorities remained fairly abstract and unformed.  Usually, ICE fixated on 
more generic types of equities that could qualify as “humanitarian” reasons 
like illness, absence of criminal record, or being the parent of citizens.76  But 
with this latest and very public congressional failure, the executive branch 
began to focus more intently on how DHS enforcement policy could cobble 
together some comparable form of relief for the Dreamer population. 
While Dreamers are often associated with DACA, several interviewees 
noted that in reality, DACA represents an extension of the prosecutorial-
discretion model that characterized the first part of the Obama 
administration’s policy.77  In other words, the parameters that eventually 
defined the contours of the DACA program were worked out during the 
Morton memos years.  Edgar, a senior advisor to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, noted that “the DACA story really has to begin much earlier 
where . . . we were attempting to kind of shift ICE to focus on convicted 
criminals . . . and so it began with that, and really, I think the DACA story 
really begins in 2010 when we issued the civil enforcement priorities 
memo.”78  When asked about when she first learned of the DACA program, 
Georgia responded:   
When did I first start to hear about it?  I mean probably in . . . early 2010 I 
would say?  Maybe 2009?  You know, . . . I guess actually because we 
started working on the [prosecutorial discretion] memos.  Yeah . . . I guess 
late 2009, early 2010 . . . you know deferred action is not a new concept, 
it’s been around for many years.79 
Many senior officials cited pushback by career ICE officials as a 
significant hurdle to successfully implementing the prosecutorial-discretion 
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directives.  Although ICE initiated a comprehensive review by lawyers in the 
field of hundreds of thousands of deportation cases for administrative 
closure, ultimately both frontline officers and agency leadership came to 
resist more affirmative efforts to protect segments of the undocumented 
population.80  According to Edgar, during President Obama’s first term, “ICE 
at this time under [John Morton] generally took a very hard line and . . . 
resisted everything.”81  This seemed to be a sentiment shared by those 
working in the White House as well.  Georgia noted: 
2011 through 2012 was a really difficult time. . . .  We had set up 
priorities for how we wanted immigration enforcement to take place.  
And, you know, our job was to set policy priorities, but I couldn’t be a 
law enforcement agent all over the country.  Neither could any of the 
headquarters people at DHS, right?  So, you know, it was the job of 
local ICE officials, thousands of them across the country to be 
executing on the policies we had put forward.82 
Senior officials also fielded complaints from the immigrant-advocacy 
community.83  A common complaint was that many immigrants with no or 
minor criminal records were being swept up into the removal pipeline.84  In 
this sense, some of the officials found the priorities to be less helpful in 
sorting through the unauthorized-migrant pool.  Although the putative focus 
of the Morton memos was on those who posed a national security threat or a 
danger to their communities, the memos also targeted recent immigration 
violators.85  But, as Edgar explained: 
[T]he third category was individuals who had reentered the country 
unlawfully.  Um, people who have been previously deported in some 
fashion.  You know, much later I realized what a problematic area that was 
in the priorities. . . .  [I]t was only after I, frankly, I got to ICE and had 
access to a lot better data.  Um that I was, you know, able to dig into their 
data pretty deep realized that a substantial portion of the 11.5 million 
[undocumented migrants in the United States] fell into that bucket.86 
The large number of migrants in this category came to overwhelm the 
process of identifying nonpriorities.  According to Edgar, this helps explain 
why immigrants and their advocates were not “feeling the change quick 
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enough.”87  As Edgar noted:  “everyone’s searching for an answer as to 
why . . . no one’s following the policies when—without realizing they are 
following the policies.”88  The empirical data confirms this observation as 
studies have shown the backlog to have steadily increased between 2007 and 
2015.89 
B.  The “Beauty of Prosecutorial Discretion” 
Senior leaders acknowledged that distrust characterized the relationship 
between senior leadership and career officials:  “And so, you know, if you 
don’t have the trust and the buy-in, something of this nature is not going to 
succeed, right?  Cause ultimately it has to rise or fall in the field.  And as 
we’ve seen, there are pockets of pretty mass resistance.”90  According to 
some officials, the distrust stemmed from a fundamental shift in how ICE 
was meant to operate.91  Georgia stated: 
The policies we were setting weren’t fully taking hold. . . .  [A] part of that 
is just, you know, it was a real shift in how an agency that was somewhat 
new but had a history of being around for a while . . . it was a shift in how 
they did business right?  They were used to just saying whoever we run into 
we’re gonna pick up.  If . . . we think they’re undocumented or bad actors, 
it doesn’t matter what their kind of equities are, right?  So it was a shift in 
kind of saying “no we don’t want you to just pick up everyone, we want 
you to think about do these people really pose a threat to our communities?”  
And you know that really took time to take hold.92 
Some officials suggested that the notion of agency pushback was 
overblown.  Steve, who served in the DHS during Obama’s second term—
that is, well after the Morton memos era had passed—deflected criticisms 
against ICE as a rogue agency: 
[Y]ou know, there may have been people at ICE that were initially hesitant.  
But you know, ICE followed orders.  You didn’t see a lot of dissent, you 
didn’t see a lot of leaking of information the way you do now . . . .  [W]ere 
they happy about everything?  But also know they weren’t out there . . . 
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when people are really offended or running roughshod they go out there 
and leak . . . that wasn’t happening either.93 
David noted that the agency was heterogeneous and comprised of a variety 
of views on the wisdom of whatever mandate senior leadership doled out.94  
Still, he did not believe such disagreement ultimately mattered: 
[A]ny law enforcement officer—federal, state or local—has their personal 
opinions but they work in at least quasi-paramilitary organizations.  And 
when they are directed to do something, they do it.  And their . . . personal 
opinions don’t really matter.  Ya know, I’m sure if you talked to certain 
police officers in Colorado and said, “hey what’s your personal opinion 
about legalizing marijuana,” some of them probably weren’t all that happy 
about it.  But they do what they have to do.95 
Whether or not the characterization of ICE at this time as a “rogue agency” 
is valid,96 what is clear is that the DHS leadership set about conducting 
trainings around the country to close the gap separating senior leadership 
from career officers.  Senior leadership did this by visiting the various field 
offices to expand on the mechanics of the prosecutorial-discretion system and 
to address concerns.  Central to this endeavor was the reconceptualization of 
lawyers in the field in the model of federal prosecutors.  The message 
political appointees circulated was clear:  that the power immigration lawyers 
in the agency exercised was akin to the criminal law enforcement powers of 
their DOJ counterparts. 
Georgia noted that “there was a series of trainings that happened after all 
the different policy memos that were put out.”97  She referred to these as 
“town halls” where Secretary Napolitano and ICE Director John Morton 
“would talk about various issues impacting the agencies, particularly 
ICE. . . .  And, you know really make a pitch that this is smart law 
enforcement . . . this is the way to kind of do your job effectively.”98 
Some senior officials plainly referenced the criminal law enforcement 
model in explaining the pre-DACA years.  When speaking with David about 
the challenges of implementing the Morton memos priorities, he noted that 
discretion was something that immigration officials could appropriately 
exercise: 
You can look at other examples where a . . . district attorney, umm, because 
of work load, may make the decision that . . . we will no longer arrest 
people for . . . possession of small amounts of marijuana.  We’re gonna 
issue a summons, something similar to a traffic citation.  And local 
jurisdictions and states . . . and even the federal government does that sort 
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of thing all the time.  And you know, the officers charged with 
implementing those decisions, they do.  It doesn’t [necessarily] mean they 
like it or support it . . . .99 
Horace, a member of senior leadership in DHS overseeing the other agency 
components, described it this way: 
ICE’s infrastructure is more what you would imagine from a law 
enforcement case management structure.  You know, where like they have 
things where they’re tracking like aspects of cases and individuals from like 
a case perspective but that’s a lot different from like a benefits agency, 
right, where there’s a lot more paper, or like whatever material, to justify a 
thing.100 
Another senior ICE official confirmed this account.  Frank spent many 
years working overseas on behalf of the federal government before joining 
the leadership team in ICE.101  One of his duties was trying to translate the 
Morton memos directives into meaningful change in the field offices.  As he 
described his role: 
I pleaded with the administration, as did others . . . to try to change the 
hearts and minds of many of those thousand attorneys, and to take a 
different role . . . than they have previously had in some cases literally for 
decades . . . in that they should not treat all cases alike, and that they should 
focus their efforts . . . their talents, and their energy on truly high priority 
cases, like terrorists and human rights violators, and murderers and rapists 
and immigration frauds . . . and to . . . not spend as much time and perhaps 
in some cases, not spend any time on visa overstays of individuals who had 
come into the country as young people . . . or people that had frankly come 
into the country later in life but had been good . . . civil citizens in a sense, 
quotation marks around “citizens” . . . and had not committed crimes, and 
had contributed to their communities and had paid their taxes.102 
Journalists from the Houston Chronicle obtained documents from ICE’s 
Houston field office.103  These documents include a variety of forms of 
communications and cover a period of approximately six months, from June 
2010 to January 2011.104  This was just a few months removed from the 
March 2, 2011, Morton memo articulating the different enforcement 
priorities and only a few weeks removed from the June 17, 2011, Morton 
memo providing immigration officers with guidance on how to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion.105  For this reason, the Houston field office 
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documents provide a glimpse into how immigration bureaucrats responded 
to directives issued by political appointees. 
The Houston field office documents tend to confirm that ICE lawyers 
viewed the Morton memos in terms of increasing efficiency in the office 
rather than in terms of realizing equity-oriented outcomes.  Agenda items for 
meetings included titles such as “Improving the Efficiency of the Removal 
Process:  Prosecutorial Discretion” with a focused examination of 
administrative devices such as joint motions to reopen, appeals, and 
remands.106  Leadership in the Houston office seemed to commit to the task 
of changing office culture through the development of local implementation 
policies and regularly held team meetings.107 
The experience of the Houston office during this time suggests that local 
offices struggled to find ways to translate the Morton memos’ dictates into 
practice.  In a memo to the attorneys in his office, Chief Counsel Gary 
Goldman explained that the “universe of opportunities to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion is large.”108  Goldman then continued to impress 
upon the legal staff a particular vision of lawyering, one that reflects 
traditional notions of prosecutorial power long associated with the criminal 
context: 
We have been empowered with independent authority to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion.  We work not in a world of black and white but 
one of many shades of grey.  That is the beauty of prosecutorial discretion. 
. . . 
ICE Senior Leadership does not want their attorneys to merely fill a 
seat in immigration court and blindly prosecute every case handed to them.  
The current administration wants attorneys of greater sophistication, 
independence, and complexity in decision making.109 
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More than anything, the model of government lawyering embraced by the 
DHS during the pre-DACA years bears shades of a key assumption that 
defines criminal law enforcement—namely, that the prosecutor is in the best 
position to judge the merits and equities of a case.110  This was one of the 
reasons some political appointees recoiled at the transition to the DACA 
model:  it wrested the power to decide who “deserved” removal from the 
hands of immigration lawyers, modeled after prosecutors, and channeled that 
power into the hands of bureaucrats in USCIS.  David, the senior ICE official, 
describes his reaction to the DACA program in terms of what is lost: 
[T]he idea of prosecutorial discretion or deferred action is not something 
uncommon in law enforcement.  It’s common in law enforcement at every 
level, but it more typically is applied to individuals on a case by case basis, 
you know at the scene of the incident.  You know, if two officers arrive at 
a bar fight just off-campus, to put it in your world . . . you know they see 
two people standing there kind of bloodied, and the prosecutorial discretion 
process begins.  They have to decide you know, are they going to arrest one 
or both?  What are they going to charge him with?  They take him to some 
sort of a, a magistrate that decides whether or not this is worth the court’s 
time, whether or not there’s probable cause . . . are they going to detain 
them, are they going to set bond?  A state prosecutor is going to decide 
whether or not to plea the case.  You know all of that is prosecutorial 
discretion.  But it tends to be on a case by case basis.  DACA was the first 
of a series of policy decisions that took large numbers of people off the 
enforcement table . . . rather than considering them on a case by case 
basis.111 
C.  Infrastructure 
As was widely reported in 2012, members of the White House met with 
Dreamer advocates during the lead-up to the program’s announcement.112  
The pressure was mounting and it was unfolding publicly.  Not surprisingly, 
on June 15, 2012, Secretary Napolitano issued a memorandum announcing 
the creation of the DACA program.113 
Many government officials acknowledged that these advocacy efforts 
spurred on the DACA conversation within the White House.  As Georgia 
explained, “[T]here were more and more conversations we were having with 
legal experts, you know outside of government . . . smart law professors 
around the country who had also been looking more at it.  Our White House 
Counsel’s office as well.  I think the work sped up in the spring of 2012.”114 
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A less well-known part of the story had to do with the conversations taking 
place among DHS senior leadership.  These conversations seemed to be 
taking place independent of the ones unfolding within the White House.  
Even though these discussions were happening independent of one another, 
both the White House and the DHS ended up pretty much in the same place.  
Georgia observed that “we were all kind of going in the same direction 
anyway.”115 
The creation of DACA represented a reallocation of authority away from 
ICE to USCIS.  Implementing the vision of the Morton memos conflicted 
with agency culture.  As Horace, a former senior DHS official, observed:  
“[I]f you don’t have the trust and the buy-in, something of this nature is not 
going to succeed, right?  Cause ultimately it has to rise or fall in the field.  
And as we’ve seen, there are pockets of pretty mass resistance.”116  Isaac, 
another senior DHS official who served the administration during the same 
period, explained that the struggle to implement that vision “had to do with 
the leadership that was put in place at ICE and, you know, just a culture of, 
you know, ‘Hands off, we’re law enforcement, we do what we want.’”117  In 
turning to USCIS, the challenge was no longer one of culture but rather of 
infrastructure. 
USCIS had experience with handling and overseeing the benefits 
program.118  At the same time, DACA was a massive undertaking.  And 
USCIS needed to build a system to handle the flood of applications that 
DACA would generate.  As Horace, a senior DHS official, observed: 
So, you know, USCIS, as you probably know, has . . . very old 
infrastructure and by infrastructure, I merely mean sort of the computer 
systems that they have to process and the various associated sort of support 
services they have there, you know, for a long time, you know, as of many 
things relating to benefits, an application was done totally on paper.119 
In the end, USCIS modified an application it had been using to process 
applications for Temporary Protected Status.120 
As was the case with prosecutorial nonenforcement decisions in ICE, 
denials of DACA applications within USCIS were exercises of discretion.  
And as is the case with almost all discretionary agency decisions, denials are 
not reviewable by federal courts.121  Still, USCIS did provide a rough 
approximation of a review process through its ombudsman office.  Those 
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working within the ombudsman office did not have the authority to reverse 
findings by USCIS adjudicators, but if an applicant disagreed with a 
disposition, she could request that the ombudsman office inquire about the 
process.122  In a report issued by the ombudsman office in 2013—the year 
after DACA went into effect—the ombudsman identified “transparency and 
consistency for individuals requesting deferred action” as a key goal for its 
office.123 
Some who worked within the ombudsman office thought that USCIS faced 
serious challenges in implementing DACA.  Felicia worked in this office 
during the Obama administration.124  A lawyer by training, she came to 
USCIS from the nonprofit sector, where she had helped provide legal 
services to immigrant communities.125  When asked about the types of 
problems her office addressed, Felicia noted: 
In the most recent round of renewals, the agency system had a glitch that 
caused background checks to . . . fall out of the queue. . . .  They were 
serious enough that it posed grave delays, and the agency wasn’t very 
straightforward about it.  At all.  Not with the community, not with the 
Congress, or with our office.126 
Although many depictions of DACA—both judicial127 and popular128—
portrayed it as an opportunity for agency officials to rubber-stamp 
applications, Felicia provided a more nuanced description of this picture.  She 
confirmed the suspicion harbored by many immigrant-rights activists that 
contact with law enforcement, even minimal contact, could be the basis for 
exclusion from the program.129  Again, here is Felicia: 
I recall seeing cases . . . where we felt the person met the requirement but 
USCIS disagreed. . . .  [W]e went back and forth on several cases that 
presented adjudications issues. . . .  [A]nd it was really hard for us to push 
those . . . in which there had been a criminal arrest.  Even if we felt that the 
underlying offense . . . disqualified the individual for DACA, I think the 
agency, you know the officers who . . . had the strictest, I think the most 
restrictive position on some of these cases . . . they were very sensitive to 
congressional inquiries about DACA recipients with criminal backgrounds.  
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Or criminal arrest[s], rather.  So I think it was nearly impossible for us to 
move any of those cases.130 
D.  Information Markets 
As legal scholars have noted, the move toward a DACA model for 
discretionary relief signaled the embrace of transparency as a mode of 
governance.131  But abandoning the “black box” of the prosecutorial 
model132 in favor of an open and transparent model for relief presented new 
regulatory challenges.  Because deferral could not be granted until and unless 
noncitizens affirmatively applied for such relief, USCIS officials focused 
their attention on ensuring that information on the content and parameters of 
the program were as accurate as possible. 
Carl worked closely with the USCIS director during the DACA rollout.133  
He noted that after the program was announced in June 2012, but before 
USCIS began accepting applications, agency officials were reluctant to “go 
out with even a little bit of piecemeal stuff here and there” for fear of 
generating “confusion among advocacy groups or service organizations.”134  
To the extent USCIS communicated with the public, Carl noted, “The 
message was, yes, we are working towards this, [but] don’t prepare anything, 
don’t give notarios anything.  We are the official source.  We will give things 
out on or about August 15.”135 
Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez have noted that one process-based 
shortcoming of DACA was its lack of public input, something that could have 
inevitably improved and legitimated the program.136  Bert worked as a senior 
legal advisor in the Obama administration after DACA had already been 
created.137  He made a similar point about the administration’s decision not 
to create DACA through notice-and-comment procedures, which is how 
significant policies are typically created: 
I was surprised they didn’t use notice and comment.  Not because I thought 
it was clear that they had to, because it was pretty clear that someone would 
challenge them on this ground, and why leave ourselves vulnerable to that 
possible lawsuit?  It probably would have delayed things about a year, but 
at the time they had the year. And to this day I scratch my head and think 
why they didn’t do it.138 
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Our interview data shows that many officials did engage stakeholders and 
other constituents even if it was not through channels prescribed by the 
Administrative Procedure Act.  In this way, DACA created a sort of 
information economy in which entities like agencies, nonprofit immigrant-
serving organizations, and for-profit notarios could establish value in (or in 
the case of notarios, defraud and potentially ruin) the lives of immigrants 
with information about a program drafted by Secretary Janet Napolitano and 
announced by President Obama in the Rose Garden. 
USCIS officials also evinced a sensitivity to norms governing the various 
noncitizen communities.  Gaia, who advised USCIS officials as a lawyer and 
counselor, noted that a challenge throughout the DACA rollout was 
convincing eligible Asian American noncitizens to apply.139  She explained:  
“We kept hearing a culture of shame from [Asian Pacific American] groups.  
People were less inclined to come out with that status because of shame.  
Didn’t see that with various Latino groups.  For them, it was more about 
fear.”140  The empirical data seems to confirm this basic trend.  According to 
the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), the DACA participation rate for people 
of Mexican origin is 68 percent while the highest participation rate among 
Asian Americans belongs to South Koreans at 24 percent.141  Chinese 
application rates are even lower.  Despite comprising the largest subgroup of 
the Asian American community, the participation rate of Chinese Americans 
is only 3 percent.142  Other studies largely confirm this basic pattern.143 
Trained as a lawyer, Serena also worked within USCIS.144  A child of 
Korean immigrants, she advised USCIS leadership on a variety of legal and 
policy-related matters.145  In discussing the role that she and other senior 
leadership played in the DACA rollout, Serena explained that it went beyond 
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merely conveying information to the public.  She said that oftentimes, it felt 
as if she urged and prodded stakeholders to engage the process, to agitate 
those in power:  “There were times when I would reach out to the Asian 
Americans groups and say ‘You guys need to show up.  I need you to, like, 
stomp your feet, like you know, be a bigger voice.’”146 
III.  THE ETHICAL DISCRETION OF IMMIGRATION LAWYERS 
IN THE GOVERNMENT 
The delegation of authority to and away from an agency in a given matter 
strongly shapes how ambiguities will be resolved and the speed with which 
those resolutions will come.147  But the relationship between the location of 
authority, the regulatory outcomes, and the external political environment 
also informs the construction of the duties owed by lawyers. 
A.  Normative Innocence 
Immigration enforcement policy during the Obama administration 
borrowed freely from the prosecutorial model associated with the criminal 
law tradition.  Gail, a high-ranking DHS official, described ICE officers as 
“immigration cops,”148 which is consistent with the messaging that OPLA 
lawyers received—that they occupied roles similar to prosecutors in the 
criminal legal system.  Prior to working in the administration, Gail spent 
several years as a federal prosecutor.149  She justified DACA precisely on 
these terms:  “[T]he sanction in immigration enforcement, deportation . . . 
ha[s] significant consequences on a person’s life.  And although it’s 
civil/administrative, it’s kind of quasi-criminal.  And even in administrative 
law there’s the concept of prosecutorial discretion.”150  At the same time, we 
should have a clear picture of what exactly is being borrowed. 
The reality is that discretion in this context tries to serve many different 
purposes.  A prosecutor may decline to charge a defendant because the 
underlying proof is weak (legal reasons), because of limited resources 
(administrative reasons), or because it would not be fair to do so (equitable 
reasons).151  DACA was justified on all of these grounds.  And the message 
was clear:  just as prosecutors enjoy freedom from judicial interference in the 
realm of charging discretion,152 so should immigration officials enjoy similar 
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degrees of autonomy.  Some of the opposition to DACA was certainly 
political disagreements masquerading as procedural objections.153  But some 
of it might also be the difficulties of asking any prosecutorial entity to impose 
sanctions for reasons of mercy or normative innocence—that is, when one 
has formally violated the law but not violated broader moral codes. 
Josh Bowers, for example, argues that there are many reasons to doubt that 
prosecutors are necessarily better situated than other actors in the criminal 
legal system to evaluate whether or not charging a particular defendant would 
be fair, including the difficulty of obtaining relevant facts in arrest records.154  
Prosecutors rely on police to gather the underlying facts, and even if 
prosecutors are inclined to exercise equitable discretion, the police will not 
necessarily share that sentiment, which makes it hard to determine whether a 
particular defendant fits the types of “normatively innocent” person entitled 
to relief.155  This institutional reality helps explain why OPLA attorneys 
might have felt resentment toward the creation of DACA.  That program was 
popularly understood as a repudiation of ICE as a whole, but from the 
vantage point of OPLA attorneys, they were being penalized for the 
shortcomings of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), the branch of 
the agency that plays the role of the police to OPLA’s prosecutors.  This is 
consistent with the view shared by senior DHS and ICE officials:  that OPLA 
attorneys followed orders but that perhaps they were not in the best position 
to evaluate normatively innocent migrants because the underlying files may 
not have been properly prepared by ERO with that goal in mind. 
Even if ICE could obtain buy-in from both the prosecutorial and 
investigatory arms of its agency, the exercise of equitable discretion along 
these lines would still pose challenges to modern administrative norms and 
practice.  Generally speaking, administrative law has developed in a manner 
that seeks to minimize unfettered discretion exercised by government 
officials.  As Rachel Barkow points out, “In a legal culture that is firmly 
committed to judicial review, wedded to reasoned decisionmaking, and 
devoted to a fair and regular process, there is little space for the exercise of 
unreviewable legal power that is dispensed without reason and without the 
need to be consistent.”156 
The interview with Edgar reflects the sort of discomfort and disconnect of 
incorporating principles of mercy into the immigration realm.  The interview 
spanned two separate sessions.  In the first interview, Edgar described the 
process of issuing the Morton memos this way: 
I—I don’t think people were feeling the change quick enough, and . . . we 
had talked about it when we established the simple enforcement priorities 
that we would also revise and issue a new policy on prosecutorial 
 
 153. See Ming H. Chen, Beyond Legality:  The Legitimacy of Executive Action in 
Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 119 (2016). 
 154. Bowers, supra note 110, at 1701. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of 
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1339 (2008). 
1904 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
discretion.  You know, . . . who are you gonna, you know, show some, you 
know, for lack of a better word, you know, mercy towards.157 
He mentioned mercy reluctantly, almost in passing.  In the second 
interview with Edgar, upon revisiting the topic of mercy, he expressed much 
greater resistance to that characterization.  Here is the exchange: 
STEPHEN LEE:  Like I’m trying to figure out how much, how much 
of the program was just about like a, you know, sorting from the 
institutional perspective to make sure you could highlight the priorities 
and . . . help use resources, and how much of it was sort of seen as like a—
almost like a clemency, uh, akin to that kind of procedure. 
EDGAR:  Uh, clemency I don’t even think is the right word, and I don’t 
like the mercy word, that’s a really weird word for me to use. . . .  Um, but 
it’s more like this; I think it was like, well, this is the right thing to do.  We 
shouldn’t waste any resources on these people, right?158 
After explaining the various benefits that Dreamers could obtain through 
DACA, Edgar continued: 
You know, um, this is a population that shouldn’t be touched.  There was a 
lot of that, so that I wouldn’t say mercy is the right word.  It’s not like, 
okay, we’re going to show compassion to this population, I mean but it was 
more like, hey, this is a population that this country shouldn’t waste any 
money or time deporting.  I mean this was the kind of mindset we had, 
right?  And we should just—shouldn’t waste time or money on this—
energy on this population, and this is the best way to take care of it, so we’re 
going to do it.   
Um, I, I don’t think we were looking at it like a—I mean I think here 
was . . . certainly some sympathy for the situation these people find 
themselves in.  There was a lot of sympathy, right?  These—I think we—
that’s reflected in the [DACA] memo.159 
Edgar then concluded by reiterating that it was the right thing to do:  “And 
there was a real strong conviction that this was the right thing to do, both 
from a . . . moral or just an ideal policy perspective but also . . . an 
enforcement perspective.”160  Not all of our interview subjects expressed 
ambivalence about the equitable strains of DACA.  Many fully embraced it 
while others simply did not acknowledge it during the course of being 
interviewed.  But Edgar’s struggle to land on a firm position on DACA’s 
equitable dimensions reflects the difficulty of fitting nearly unfettered 
discretionary decision-making within the modern administrative state. 
Immigration scholars have defended the DACA program as a 
constitutionally permissible expression of the president’s duties to “take 
Care” that the laws be faithfully executed.161  These types of arguments have 
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tended to amount to a broader defense of the president’s ability to preserve 
resources and set priorities.  Focusing on the normative innocence of DACA 
beneficiaries highlights another executive power also memorialized in the 
Constitution, namely the power to pardon and to grant clemency.162  
Presidents can exercise this power in a systematic fashion, which provides 
the president with a “bully pulpit” to persuade Congress and the public that 
legislation should be changed.163  In many ways, DACA did precisely that.  
DACA’s content was derived entirely from the DREAM Act, a failed 
legislative action, which sent a strong signal of the president’s 
disappointment with the failure to pass the bill.  But because DACA was 
presented as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion grounded in the logic of 
resource allocation and the centralization of authority, the moral dimensions 
of the program did not figure easily or readily into public justifications for 
the program.  DACA as an act of clemency points to an alternative reality in 
which the program operated as a moral disagreement with an immigration 
system created by Congress that deprived childhood arrivals of any 
meaningful attempt to adjust their status. 
Viewing DACA through the lens of clemency also forces the question of 
accountability.  Professor Barkow observes: 
Because the clemency decision is squarely placed with the President, 
it is a decision for which he or she is plainly accountable.  Executive 
discretion not to bring charges could rest anywhere down the chain of 
command, including a law enforcement officer’s decision not to arrest or 
investigate, or a line prosecutor’s decision not to bring charges.  Unlike the 
President, those individuals are neither elected nor directly democratically 
accountable.164 
This observation pairs with the view from within the Obama administration 
that DACA offered the country a big and daring governmental program.  In 
a candid moment, Edgar bluntly stated the motivation for moving away from 
the prosecutorial-discretion model toward DACA:  “I think a lot of our 
internal reflection was boy everything we’ve done has been half measures—
everything’s been compromises, you know with ICE.  Well maybe we should 
just say fuck the compromises, you know, and just get something done.”165  
While DACA certainly moves past the “half measure” of a Morton memos 
regime, the clemency frame suggests that DACA itself was a kind of hedge.  
It reflected a discretionary decision that avoided the moral implications of an 
immigration code that created the pool of childhood arrivals in the first place. 
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As Peter Markowitz and Lindsay Nash argue, the president has the power 
to pardon noncitizens for their immigration offenses.166  A clemency version 
of DACA could have offered noncitizens the same terms for relief but would 
have proceeded in a different form.  The name of the president, and not the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, would be on the issuing document.  In the 
version of DACA that we know, government lawyers advised Secretary 
Napolitano and grounded the program in cornerstone administrative law 
decisions like Heckler v. Chaney,167 which discouraged judges from 
scrutinizing too heavily the nonenforcement decisions of agencies.  In the 
clemency version of DACA, government lawyers can do even less because 
the nature of pardoning is political—the rewards and penalties are issued in 
the arena of political elections. 
As for that version of DACA, Georgia intimated that the president was 
reluctant to use his bully pulpit too aggressively, at least on that issue.  As 
she explained: 
[T]he impact [DACA] would have on the legislative debate is also 
something we talked about.  People wanted us to do DACA immediately 
after the DREAM Act failed in 2010, and I think the President was still not 
ready to go there.  And you know, a part of it was that he knew it was going 
to have an impact on the debate.  It could have a positive impact in 
jumpstarting the conversation, . . . or it could have a negative impact.  We 
weren’t certain umm the impact it was gonna have.  In our case an election 
was also happening, so when we did announce it . . . the kind of excitement 
around DACA, combined with you know the outcome of the election 
actually did jumpstart the debate again in 2013.168 
In the end, it is tempting to conclude that policies taking power away from 
frontline lawyers and giving it to high-level advisors means that government 
lawyers should not effectuate policies grounded in views of normative 
innocence.  The mixed and at times jumbled justifications for DACA 
suggests this to be the case.  But it also seems true that these sorts of executive 
actions could be squarely based on equitable considerations like normative 
innocence or mercy so long as the president himself—and not frontline 
officers or even his political appointee surrogates—was willing to bear the 
political cost for doing so. 
B.  Persistent Moral Engagement 
Scholars argue that lawyers acting in an advisory capacity to political 
actors at the upper echelons of the executive branch are obligated to 
incorporate principles of independence and candid advice-giving in their 
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work.169  They have a greater duty to the public interest,170 implicitly due to 
the weight of authority that they bear, whereas lawyers acting in an advocacy 
capacity, particularly those who represent agencies in litigation, arguably 
have a greater duty to carry out that agency’s imperatives as defined by 
supervisors and the political appointees to whom they report.171  Scholars 
have forcefully argued that lawyers in the latter category do not possess 
ethical discretion with regard to their own conceptions of the public interest 
and are duty-bound to take orders and implement policies.172  In this section, 
we explore how the foundational dichotomy in the government-lawyering 
literature—public interest versus agency imperative—both holds up and 
comes apart in the context of the immigration initiatives discussed above.  
These conceptions contextualize the Morton memos and DACA, even as the 
facts from these policy narratives test the continuing vitality of the ideas that 
shape the ethical practice of government lawyering. 
Judge Patricia Wald called the public interest the “phantom client” of the 
government lawyer.173  It is almost a truism that government lawyers—
among multiple other duties—are charged with advancing the public interest: 
A government lawyer serves the interests of many different entities:  his 
supervisor in the department or agency, the agency itself, the statutory 
mission of the agency, the entire government of which that agency is a part, 
and the public interest. . . .  The government attorney’s duty is not to a client 
but to the set of institutions through which society is governed and the 
public interest is pursued.174 
But the idea is tested by the various contexts in which government lawyers 
practice.  They perform widely varied functions with differing levels of 
authority for their practices.175  This is the case for the immigration lawyers 
serving the state.  As described above, lawyers like Georgia advise the 
president in the White House, while Edgar serves the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, David provides counsel to principals in ICE, and frontline attorneys 
represent the government in adversarial deportation proceedings overseen by 
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DOJ lawyers in their role as administrative adjudicators.176  The capacity of 
these attorneys to exercise independence and to act on their understanding of 
the public interest varies widely depending on their position in the agency 
hierarchy, their proximity to political figures with authority, and their 
function, whether advisory or advocacy. 
This challenge is exacerbated when an agency acts on controversial subject 
matter.  Indeed, foundational to the public-choice critiques of the public 
interest, such as by Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, is the contention 
that a common good cannot be discerned and acted upon: 
[T]he constitutional system of checks and balances depends upon the 
institutional loyalty of its attorneys.  Although this argument runs counter 
to the common intuition that the government attorney should act to further 
the common good, we argue that this common view is ultimately 
insupportable, in large part because there is simply no consensus in our 
pluralistic society as to what constitutes the common good.177 
In the immigration context, there are sharply contested views about what 
the state should do with regard to undocumented people in the United States.  
Macey and Miller would likely point to the immigration example as a prime 
case study arguing against the pursuit of the public interest in government 
lawyering.  In their conception, politics is a market in which individual 
interests compete for primacy.178  Government lawyers must remain careful 
to either work on behalf of the winning ideas, or on behalf of elected leaders, 
and to refrain from advancing their own vision of the common good through 
their work.179  When government lawyers act with a degree of independence 
from political authorities they are understood to be in danger of substituting 
their own individual beliefs for government policy.180  In the rhetorical 
structure suggested by William Simon, the choice that is constructed is 
between legitimate, libertarian, client-centered “legal” ends versus 
illegitimate, inchoate, “moral” ends.181 
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There is dissensus in every policy arena, even those understood to rely 
upon a common moral code, as in the case of torture.182  Indeed, there are 
political interests in the United States that benefit from dissensus even in the 
face of established facts.  A public-choice approach to government 
lawyering, combined with manufactured dissensus, leads to winner-take-all 
politics in which elected officials are motivated to mobilize the state in favor 
of their narrow political interests, as appears to be occurring currently.  And 
government lawyers engaged in prosecutorial functions have been largely 
freed of limits that might be imposed by ethical norms, as they have pursued 
the agency imperatives of a carceral state.183  DACA presents an example of 
government lawyers acting in advisory roles and counseling their principals 
to implement policy in contravention of applicable law with some underlying 
notion of a public interest at stake.  Even in the muddled policy justifications 
for DACA delineated in the preceding section, government lawyers 
reluctantly embraced equity-based rationales that aligned with the direction 
ultimately given to them by the White House.  The dichotomy between public 
interest and agency imperative comes apart in this instance.  Government 
lawyers appear to have a degree of moral engagement in the midst of policy 
dissensus both outside and within the state. 
C.  Constructing the Public Interest 
DACA may help us understand with greater clarity how the public interest 
is constructed in government lawyering.  The pre-DACA years of DHS 
immigration enforcement provide greater texture to ongoing discussions 
about how power is and should be allocated within the executive branch.  A 
group of administrative law scholars have shined a light on an “internal 
separation of powers.”184  These principles and legal mechanisms help create 
rivalries within the executive branch akin to traditional notions of separation 
of powers, which govern the federal government generally and for the same 
purpose:  to reduce the consolidation of power in one faction thereby 
guarding against tyrannical rule.185 
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In terms of accountability, internal separation of powers became more 
important as the Obama administration transitioned from the first term to the 
second.  In describing DACA, Horace observed that “[i]t was also really 
important . . . from a policy perspective that the program be essentially self-
funded.”186  As the DHS utilized DACA as a mechanism for protecting 
Dreamers, agency decisions became even more insulated against 
congressional oversight given that the program was self-funded.  This stands 
in stark contrast to the prosecutorial-discretion model in which Congress 
could dial down DHS funding through the appropriations process.  But 
allowing otherwise removable immigrants to apply for deferred-action status 
enabled USCIS to collect fees, which effectively kept the program afloat and 
more importantly insulated against congressional intervention through the 
funding process.187 
This dynamic within the Obama administration illustrates two points that 
once again complicate the public-interest versus agency-imperative 
dichotomy.  First, frontline lawyers and officers in ICE may have been 
pursuing what they perceived to be the public interest, as defined by laws on 
the books and congressional opposition to changes to those laws.188  
Relatedly, the public interest is defined down in the face of difficult social 
challenges, such as migration and economic dislocation.  The state begins to 
define success through quantitative performance measures.189  In Mary Fan’s 
words, “the system slides into staging impressive displays of power rather 
than doing the hard job of aiming for effective strategy.”190 
Second, when frontline lawyers feel political or personal affinity with 
enforcement agents, there is potential for pervasive individual or institutional 
conflicts.191  When OPLA attorneys saw their office (or the authority of their 
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office)192 or ICE enforcement agents as their client, conflicts arose when the 
leadership to whom they report sought to move the agency against those 
preferences.193  Interestingly, this happened to a degree even when leadership 
sought to endow ICE attorneys with greater prosecutorial discretion.  While 
leadership saw the Morton memos as authority-enhancing, the substantive 
end of the administrative closure of thousands of deportation cases cut 
against frontline policy preferences.  Immigration prosecutors in ICE 
refrained from exercising their discretion.  In contrast, lawyers in advisory 
functions relied, at least in part, on a conception of the public interest. 
The scholarly debate over public fiduciary theory may help us understand 
how government lawyers may define the public interest.194  Evan J. Criddle 
and Evan Fox-Decent argue that government lawyers have “first order” 
duties to their putative clients and “second order” duties to a broader 
conception of the public interest.195  Seth Davis warns against an investment 
in the legitimation of a fiduciary government, a conception repeatedly used 
by colonial regimes to oppress and harm indigenous peoples.196  The 
government deploys discretionary power over private parties and displaces 
their agency.  Davis’s warning is particularly apropos in this case because of 
the vulnerability of undocumented people, like American Indians, to the 
plenary power of the federal government. 
In the case of DACA, social movement organizations mobilized against 
the immigration enforcement practices of the Obama administration with 
particular vigor after the failure of the DREAM Act in 2010.  Social 
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movements mobilize power in multiple ways.  In this case, political interests 
within and outside of the government aligned to produce a proto-
administrative regime that offered temporary, contingent respite from 
immigration enforcement.197  Government lawyers in advisory roles used 
their ethical discretion to coproduce DACA.  Drilling down on the role of 
social movements in the construction of the public interest in government 
lawyering, particularly in the context of prosecutorial-justice regimes, is an 
essential endeavor in the age of mass incarceration and should be the subject 
of future work in this area. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have tried to remind legal scholars that lawyers in the 
government perform a diverse and heterogeneous array of work related to 
immigration policy.  Revisiting immigration-enforcement policies of the 
Obama administration not only helps to empirically confirm the 
centralization theory of DACA advanced by immigration scholars but also 
shows that competing notions of professional responsibility and government 
lawyering animated the process by which authority was assigned, withdrawn, 
and reassigned.  We know that government lawyering makes a difference in 
the realm of immigration enforcement, and we are just at the beginning stages 
of knowing exactly how and why it does. 
DACA provides a case study in how a type of administrative justice came 
to replace prosecutorial justice, in part due to the ethical discretion exercised 
by lawyers acting in advisory functions at the White House and within DHS.  
Lawyers must always construct client interests in the varied contexts in which 
they work,198 and that construction is never as straightforward as public-
choice theorists might posit.  There is a degree of ethical discretion inherent 
in the decision-making of all lawyers, including those in service of the 
government.  A conception of the public interest that may cause the lawyer 
to reconstruct their client’s interests through some form of moral dialogue is 
an inherent element of the lawyer-client relationship.199  This moral 
autonomy is essential in a context in which prosecutorial power remains 
largely unchecked.  In the case of DACA, administrative justice enabled 
government lawyers to advance the public interest. 
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